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Current Problems in
California Subdivision Control
By CLARENCE TAYLOR*
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property
that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the
general good of the whole community .... Besides, the public good
is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of
every individual's private rights, as modeled by the municipal law.
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 139
"Be sure you are right, then go ahead." There is nothing in the
nature of American constitutional law which should produce timidity
or the palsying of effort by fear of constitutional difficulties. The
American Constitution is sufficiently beneficent and wide-armed to
receive within its protection whatever is morally and intellectually
justifiable and really needed for the public welfare.
BETT-MAN, CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERs 84 (1946).
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is
or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive.... The values it represents are spiritual as well as phys-
ical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.
Douglas, J., for the Court in Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
IN THE YEARS conventionally numbered from Euclid v. Ambler'
in 1926, controlling or influencing land use and land development has
become a major enterprise of federal, state, and local governments.
Dismally for the lawyer, the legal aspects of the endeavor assume
multi-volume proportions. If the matter poses any single central ques-
tion, however, it surely is, "Who is to make the land-use, the land-
development, decisions?" Assuming, as one must, that the answer is
to have a strong public flavor, a further question arises: "Just how
* A.B., 1949, U.C.L.A.; LL.B., 1952, Hastings College of the Law; Editor, Continu-
ing Education of the Bar; member, California Bar.
1 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Perhaps in California we should say since Miller v. Board of
Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925) and Zahn v. Board of Public Works,
195 Cal. 497, 234 Pac. 388 (1925), the local landmark zoning decisions.
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onerous can the public decision, constraint, or influence be-how
sharply can it bite into the traditional, and presumably still existing,
prerogatives and expectations of the property owner?"
If the entire matter could be thus reduced, an orderly-minded per-
son might assume that there is an agency at some tier of government
that simply tells the landowner what he must, may, or may not do.
Any inviolable immunities or powers of the landowner might be spec-
ified at length in charter fashion. But, unfortunately, neither govern-
ment, private property, nor public planning is this simple. And neither
is the relevant legal and constitutional history. To the distress of the
more positive-minded public planners, the specific devices available
to implement public planning have an almost gimmick-like quality.
Subdivision control, as exercised through map or plat approval, is an
example.
The explanation is largely historical. In the late 1800's, most states
enacted subdivision map acts that were concerned simply with the
easy and accurate description of land. California did So. 2 Somewhat
later, the requisite of public approval and such rudimentary require-
ments as street alignment were added. California did this too.3 Then,
about the time zoning started to become universal practice, it dawned
upon most observers that every subdivision becomes an important and
relatively permanent feature of the community-that every urban area
is, for the most part, a composite of the plans of individual subdivisions.
The obvious conclusion was drawn that if there is ever to be any public
planning and control of land development and use, there is no better
stage for it than at the critical first division of land into usable parcels.4
In 1928, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the agency that also
prepared the model zoning act which became the base for most zoning
2 Cal. Stat. 1893, ch. 80, §§ 1-4, p. 96.
3 Cal. Stat. 1907, ch. 231, § 19, p. 290; Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 191 Pac. 14
(1920).
4 The oft-quoted statement of these considerations is that of RATcLWF, URBAN LAND
EcoNoMIcs 415 (1949):
In the entire process of city growth, there-is no step more critical than the
original subdivision of raw land. To a considerable extent, the size and shape of
the lots, the street system that is provided, and the general character of the land
planning determine the use to which the land is to be permanently dedicated.
The character of the neighborhood is largely established by the way in which
the land is subdivided. Furthermore, there is little chance to offset or remedy
the mistakes in judgment or the errors of shortsighted cupidity that are reflected
in the land arrangements; for, once the lots have been sold off into individual
ownership, even a few of them, replanning and resubdividing become virtually
impracticable. Subdividers, then, are city builders, builders of a structure that
lives down through the years as a boon or a burden for the men and women and
children who must live out their lives within an environment over which they
bad no original control.
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law in this country, promulgated its Standard City Planning Enabling
Act.5 The subdivision control provisions of this proposal became parity
for American jurisdictions in the regulation of subdivision develop-
ment. California accepted them. The current Subdivision Map Act,0
although much amended and frequently recast, is traceable to an en-
actment of 1929 that is identifiably the Department of Commerce pro-
posal. In this third stage of subdivision control, preoccupation is with
(1) integration of the particular subdivision into the community's
plans for its own development, and (2) the imposition of qualitative
controls that presumably assure subdivision development in a manner
conducive to the well-being of the prospective occupants and the
community in general.
This type of regulation is still much in evidence and undoubtedly
will continue indefinitely. California courts state the primary purposes
of the Subdivision Map Act to be (1) to provide for control of the de-
sign and improvement of subdivisions with proper consideration of
their relation to adjoining areas, 8 and (2) to require the subdivider to
do the original work of providing or improving streets and other
improvements before their maintenance is taken over by the city or
county.9 But without leaving behind this "design and improvement"
type regulation, subdivision planning and control has entered its fourth
and critical stage. The comparatively simple map acts and their im-
plementing local ordinances have been swept up in the whole range
of governmental and financial problems associated with rapid and ex-
tensive urban growth. The general result has been that communities
have attempted to ameliorate some of the problems by imposition of
novel conditions and requirements in connection with land subdivi-
sion. The clash, of course, is with the property rights of owners and
developers.
Legal aspects of this development, as it has occurred in other
states, has been much discussed in recent literature.'" California cer-
See HARR, LAND-USE PLANNING 347-351 (1959); Reps, Control of Land Subdivi-
sion by Municipal Planning Boards, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 258 (1955).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11500-641.
See Cal. Stat. 1929, ch. 837, §§ 1-40, pp. 1790-1805.
Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
"Hoover v. Kern County, 118 Cal. App. 2d 139, 257 P.2d 492 (1953).
10 E.g., Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on ihe
Urban Fringe, Wis. L. REv. 370 (1961); Delehant, Representing the Land Developer:
Step by Step Techniques, 40 NEB. L. REv. 330 (1961); Fagin, Regulating the Timing of
Urban Development, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 298 (1955); Frey, Subdivision Control
and Planning, 1961 ILL. L. FORUM 411 (1961); Panel, Subdivision Regulations Requiring
Utilities, Streets, Parks, Etc., 23 NIMLO Mumi. L. REv. 615 (1960); Schmandt, Municipal
Control of Urban Expansion, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 637 (1961); Smith, The Dilemma
Faced by Municipalities in Controlling Nearby Land Development, 40 NEB. L. REv. 318
(1961).
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tainly has the underlying growth and planning problem. Presumably
we shall also have the full statutory and case law sequelae. After an
outline of the California law providing for subdivision approval, this
article summarizes the existing statutory provisions and decisions on
the more prevalent problems.
The Subdivision Map Act
Understanding of California subdivision regulation is frequently
confused because it involves two different sets of state laws and two
different types of local ordinances, i.e., the Subdivision Map Act, the
Real Estate Law,1' local ordinances directly implementing the map
act, and local ordinances adopted under other powers of cities and
counties. 12
The Subdivision Map Act is the enabling statute for local super-
vision of subdivisions. Its enforcement is entirely local; there is no
state agency directly concerned with its administration.
The Real Estate Law is administered by the State Real Estate
Commissioner. Its purpose is to prevent fraud, misrepresentation, and
deceit in the marketing of parcels. Usually this is done by issuing a
"subdivision public report" for the information of prospective pur-
chasers. The Real Estate Commissioner has no authority to control
directly the manner of subdivision or the making of improvements.
Apart from the provisions added to deal with specific problems,
the Subdivision Map Act vests control of the "design" and "improve-
ment" of "subdivisions" in the governing body of cities and counties.
Each city and county is required to enact an ordinance for the pur-
pose. 13 With minor exceptions and qualifications, the act's definition
of "subdivision" can be paraphrased as being real property-improved
or not-shown on the latest adopted tax roll as a unit or contiguous
unit-divided for the purpose of sale or lease-into five or more parcels
-within any one-year period.'4 "'Design' refers to street alignment,
grades and widths, alignment and widths of easements and right
of ways for drainage and sanitary sewers and minimum lot area
and width."'5 "'Improvement' refers to only such street work and
utilities to be installed, or agreed to be installed by the subdivider on
the land to be used for public or private streets, highways, ways, and
easements, as are necessary for the general use of the lot owners in the
11 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE: §§ 11000-202.
12 See Griffin, Subdivision Regulation, ch. 26 in CAL omIA LAND SEcuarY AND
DEVELOPMENT (Cal. C.E.B. 1960); SUIDMV*SION MANUAL (California Senate, 1959).
13 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11525.
14 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11535.
15 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11510.
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subdivision and local neighborhood traffic and drainage needs .... "I
With the exception of these definitions, the act makes no general
reference to conditions that may be imposed or requirements that may
be made in the local ordinance. It blandly states:17
In case there is a local ordinance, the subdivider shall comply
with its provisions before the map or maps of a subdivision may be
approved. In case there is no local ordinance, the governing body
may, as a condition precedent to the approval of the map or maps of
a subdivision, require streets and drainage ways properly located and
of adequate width, but may make no other requirements.
The subdivider is provided a direct procedural avenue for challenging
conditions or requirements. The act provides that if he is dissatisfied
with any action of the planning commission with respect to his tenta-
tive map, or the kinds, nature, and extent of the improvements re-
quired, he may appeal to the governing body for a public hearing. The
governing body is required to hear testimony respecting the character
of the neighborhood in which the subdivision is to be located, the
kinds, nature and extent of improvements, and the quality or kinds of
development to which the area is best adapted. It may sustain, modify
or reject any recommendations or rulings of the planning commission
and "may make such findings as are not inconsistent with the provisions
of [the act] ... or local ordinance adopted pursuant to [the act] .... 18
In 1961, the legislature authorized creation of a subdivision map
appeal board by any city or county as an intermediary between the
planning commission and the governing body 19 If an appeal board
is created, appeals from the planning commission to the board, and
from the board to the governing body, are upon the same basis as
appeals directly from the commission to the governing body.
The decision of the governing body concerning design or improve-
ments is expressly made subject to review as to its reasonableness by
the superior court. A special proceeding may be brought within ninety
days after the decision and the proceeding is given a prescribed pre-
cedence over other matters on the calendar.2 0 At least as judged by
appellate decisions, the direct court review proceedings appear to be
little used. Perhaps the reasoning is that logically, if inartistically, ex-
pressed by one development-minded lawyer: 21
16 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11511.
17 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11551.
18 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11552.
19 Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 194, § 1, p. 1200, § 3, p. 1201-2; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 11512, 11552.
20 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11525.
21 Delhant, supra note 10.
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There is one thing to remember, that you almost have to win on
the approval of a plat before the planning board and the city council.
Court appeals from denials are almost impossible, because basically
when a plat is denied with no grounds stated, you have to prove that
the action of the board was arbitrary, and you would be surprised
how many nonarbitrary reasons a board or a city can come up with
between the time they denied the plat without approval and the time
you get to court. So the only way to hope for a successful appeal, in
my opinion, would be to nail the administrative body down by a
court reporter and a record on the grounds of the denial; in other
words, what are the grounds? "Because you won't dedicate parks."
Finel Then you can go to court.
Local Ordinances
City and county ordinances attaching conditions to the approval
of subdivision maps fall into two categories: (1) those which derive
their force from the enabling Subdivision Map Act, and (2) those
which may be validly enacted without regard to that legislation. The
act defines the kind of local ordinance it contemplates: "'Local ordi-
nance' refers to an ordinance regulating the design and improvement
of subdivisions, enacted by the governing body of any city or county
under the provisions of this [act] ..., in so far as the provisions of the
ordinance are consistent with and not in conflict with the provisions
of this [act] ... ,"22
But there can be at least three types of ordinances relating to sub-
divisions that would not necessarily be inconsistent with the act: (1)
those regulating divisions of land that are not "subdivisions" within the
meaning of the act; (2) those imposing requirements or conditions
pursuant to the general homerule powers of cities and counties; and
(3) those based upon state legislation other than the Subdivision Map
Act.
It is true that the only definition of "subdivision" is that set forth
in the act. Local ordinances cannot change the definition. The act,
however, expressly leaves cities and counties free to regulate transac-
tions that are not "subdivisions" as defined in the state statute.23 The
result is that requirements of a city or county respecting divisions of
land cannot be determined from the Subdivision Map Act alone.
Many localities require the filing of a map, or at least the making of
some sort of application, in cases of divisions that do not come within
the statutory definition. In many cities and a few counties, local ordi-
nances require filing of a map for a division of land into two parcels. 24-
22 CAL. Bus. & PNoF. CODE § 11506.
23 CAL. Bus. & PnOF. CODE § 11540.1; 12 CAL. Ops. ATr'Y GE. 74 (1948).
24 See Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d 439 (1950); Morris
v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 2d 856, 254 P.2d 935 (1953).
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Home rule powers of both cities and counties can justify additional
subdivision requirements. In dealing with the argument that these
necessarily conflict with the state act, the Supreme Court has stated:25
It must be obvious at the outset that this effect may not be drawn
from the statute or from the city's organic law or ordinances. The
foregoing review of those provisions does not indicate that the au-
thority of the city planners is so circumscribed. The status of an
autonomous city ... is recognized by express references to city ordi-
nances in the Subdivision Map Act. Where as here no specific restric-
tion or limitation on the city's power is contained in the charter, and
none forbidding the particular conditions is included either in the
Subdivision Map Act or the city ordinances, it is proper to conclude
that conditions are lawful which are not inconsistent with the map
act and the ordinances and are reasonably required by the subdivision
type and use as related to the character of local and neighborhood
planning and traffic conditions.
The result is a range of decisions dealing with the question whether
particular requirements or conditions "conflict with" or "supplement"
those contemplated by the state act.26
State legislation other than the Subdivision Map Act can also be
the basis for ordinances preventing or conditioning the approval of
maps. For example, both zoning and master planning have been held
to be "based on statutes of equal dignity with the Subdivision Map
Act" and therefore capable of excluding or qualifying approval of sub-
divisions.2 - There are, of course, many items of state legislation con-
cerning local government and finance that conceivably can be made
the basis of conditions to subdivision approval. But to the extent that
these conditions deal with matters almost unrelated to subdivision reg-
ulation, they add little to the power of the locality to issue or deny
building permits. 28
Compulsory Dedication of Land
Subdivision development creates vast needs for new public im-
provements, facilities, and services. The urgency of the situation is
nicely illustrated by one judicial decision that a planning commission
lacks authority to disapprove a subdivision because it would cause an
"unbearable financial burden" to the locality in providing schools,
roads, and police and fire protection.2 9
25 Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 37, 207 P.2d 1, 5 (1949).
26 For a recent example see Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App.
2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1960).
27 Roney v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740,
292 P.2d 529 (1956).
28 See, e.g., Associated Homebuilders v. City of Livermore, 56 Cal. 2d 866, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 5, 366 P.2d 448 (1961).
29 Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814 (1954).
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Intensive efforts are being made to find ways of passing at least
part of the costs along to either the developer or new residents. A wave
of litigation arising out of subdivision regulation is the result. The con-
troversy centers around two questions: (1) whether cities and counties
may compel the dedication of land within new developments for public
purposes other than streets and utilities; and (2) whether they may
compel payment of sums of money in lieu of dedication for such pur-
poses. The more basic issue is whether the subdivider can be required
to provide land or funds for projects and improvements not directly
related to and for the exclusive benefit of the land to be developed and
its subsequent owners.30 The need for public improvements is com-
monly analyzed in terms of "on site," that is, within the subdivision
itself, and "off site," or at a distance away from the actual develop-
ment. The prominent methods of defraying costs or avoiding public
expenditure are limited to four:
1. Subdivision ordinances requiring improvements clearly "on site"
in nature.
2. Subdivision ordinances requiring dedication of land for parks,
schools, and other public areas that serve both residents of the subdi-
vision (on site) and other persons (off site).
3. Ordinances requiring payment in cash toward cost of parks,
school sites, and sewers, etc., that usually are partly "off site" and
partly "on site" in nature.
4. Negotiated dedications of land or payments in cash as a con-
dition to map approval, but not in conformity with any requirements
that are written into the subdivision ordinance.81
The divergent judicial attitudes toward compulsory dedication are
illustrated by two nationally leading cases. The first American decision
dealing with subdivision regulation is Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of
Detroit.32 The subdivider objected to dedication of strips of land along
boundary streets and contended that his private property was being
taken for public use without just compensation. The court replied that
this argument would have merit
... .f this were a case where the plat had been recorded and the
city were undertaking to widen the streets or to establish a building
line. But this is not such a case. Here the city is not trying to compel
a dedication. It cannot compel the plaintiff to subdivide its property
or to dedicate any part of it for streets. It can, however, impose any
3o See Schmandt, supra note 10.
31 See Cutler, supra note 10; Comment, Wis. L. l Ev. 310 (1961); Note, 12 SYRA-
casE L. REv. 224 (1960). See also Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Plan-
ning, 58 CoLum. L. R v. 650 (1958).
82241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
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reasonable condition which must be complied with before the sub-
division is accepted for record. In theory, at least, the owner of a
subdivision voluntarily dedicates sufficient land for streets in return
for the advantage and privilege of having his plat recorded."3
This argument that subdivision is a "privilege" to which almost any
condition can be attached has been repeated many, many times.34 But
courts do rebel. In Miller v. City of Beaver Falls,"5 for example, the
Pennsylvania court, inquired: 3°
Shall this principle relating to streets, which are narrow, well defined
and absolutely necessary, be extended to parks and playgrounds
which may be very large and very desirable but not necessary? . . .
The city is not without a remedy, but it cannot eat its cake and have
its penny too. If it desires plaintiff's land for a park or playground
which it considers desirable or necessary for its future progress, it
can readily and lawfully obtain this land in accordance with the Con-
stitution which, we repeat, is the Supreme Law of the land. The
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania empower the city to take and appropriate private land for
public purposes. All that is required is that just compensation be
paid therefor.
All learning in California on this problem, and, in charity, most of
the confusion, derives from Ayres v. City Council of Los AngelesY7
The Los Angeles planning commission not only specified the dedica-
tion of additional land along a boundary street but required the widen-
ing from sixty to eighty feet of one of the interior streets. This street
was to connect two main thoroughfares. The subdivider entered the
usual complaint that the benefit to the lot owners would be relatively
small compared to the general benefit of the city as a whole. The court
held:3 18
It is no defense to the conditions imposed... that their fulfillment
will incidentally also benefit the city as a whole. Nor is it a valid
objection to say that the conditions contemplate future as well as
more immediate needs. Potential as well as present population fac-
tors affecting the subdivision and the neighborhood generally are
appropriate for consideration.
To the additional objection that, since these street widenings were
part of the city plan and eventually would be carried out in any event,
the dedication requirements amounted to eminent domain the court
replied:3 9
33Id. at 472, 217 N.W. at 59.
34 See Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 524 (1950).
35 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
3 Id. at 193, 82 A.2d at 36.
37 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
38 Id. at 41, 207 P.2d at 7.
39 Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 7.
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A sufficient answer is that the proceeding here involved is not one
in eminent domain nor is the city seeking to exercise that power. It
is the petitioner who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot sub-
division and upon him rests the duty of compliance with reasonable
conditions for design, dedication, improvement and restrictive use of
the land so as to conform to the safety and general welfare of the lot
owners in the subdivision and of the public.
The California Attorney General has construed the Ayres decision
rather narrowly. The question was put whether an ordinance would
be valid which would require that every subdivider either donate to
the appropriate school district property ,vithin the subdivision for
school building purposes or pay to the school district fifty dollars for
each lot within the subdivision. His conclusions were that either re-
quirement would be invalid.40 In subsequently extending these views
to dedication for a variety of purposes, he explained the Ayres deci-
sion as follows: 4
1
To what extent, then, is the Ayres case applicable to dispose of the
questions here presented? In view of the ambiguity of the opinion
we cannot say with absolute assurance. We conclude, however, that
the Ayres decision properly may be limited to the factual context
giving rise to it. There, a chartered city was seeking to resolve a
potentially serious traffic problem, threatening the health and safety
of both the residents of the subdivision and the rest of the commu-
nity, by requiring dedication of a street planting strip. We think it
fair, therefore, to say that the Ayres case stands as clear authority
only for the proposition that the act does not preclude local regula-
tions reasonably required by the subdivision type and related to the
character of local and neighborhood traffic, health and safety needs;
and that the regulations there challenged so qualified....
Requiring dedication of land for school purposes surely cannot be
said to be a condition reasonably related to the character of local and
neighborhood traffic, health and safety needs. Accordingly, we re-
affirm our ruling . . . that requiring dedication for such purposes
constitutes a condition going far beyond those conditions contem-
plated by the Subdivision Map Act and which may be imposed con-
sistent therewith.
The latest judicial development is only an analogy. In Bringle v.
Board of Supervisors,42 an owner of property in Orange County owned
property zoned for agricultural purposes. He held a five-year variance
permitting use of the property as a storage yard for equipment. As a
condition to renewing the variance, the county required dedication of
a thirty foot wide strip. The District Court of Appeal held this a clear
40 22 CAr. Ors. Aitr'y GFN. 168 (1953).
4129 CAL. Ops. Ar'y Cr. 49, 53 (1957).
4254 Cal. 2d 86; 4 Cal. Rptr. 493, 351 P.2d 765 (1960).
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case of taking without compensation.43 The Supreme Court ruled,
however, that the condition was permissible... in the absence of any
evidence by such owner as to the effect on traffic conditions... or any
showing that the need for widening the street was not related to use
of the property.44
Conditions imposed in connection with zoning variances are, of
course, clearly distinguishable from those imposed upon the subdi-
vider. A variance is aptly described as a "privilege." It may be, how-
ever, that the Bringle decision foretells a general relaxing of supposed
limitations, at least as to requirements that can even remotely be made
to seem "on-site."
Fees
Analytically, the charging of fees for various purposes as a prereq-
uisite to approval of a subdivision map presents the same problem as
compulsory dedication. The leading California case is Kelber v. Up-
land.45 The decision invalidated an ordinance requiring the subdi-
vider, as a condition to approval of his map, to pay thirty dollars per
lot into a park and school site fund and a large sum into a drainage
fund. The city argued that the provision, designed to help meet its
growing needs, was in line with the modern tendency to extend the
police power to include broader fields of public welfare. Although the
case was determined on grounds of lack of authority in the Subdivision
Map Act, language in the opinion cast doubt on the validity of such a
requirement even with express legislative authorization. The Supreme
Court denied a hearing by a four to three vote.
With respect to the map act, the District Court of Appeal summa-
rized its views as follows:46
While the act specifically and impliedly permits the adoption of some
local ordinances, relating to design and improvement, this is not an
unlimited permission but is restricted to such local ordinances as
come within the limitations contained in the act .... All of the refer-
ences to local ordinances in the Subdivision Map Act relate to a local
ordinance as defined in the statute, and to the design and improve-
ment of subdivisions which are also defined in the statute .... It
rather clearly appears that these fee provisions are fund raising meth-
ods for the purpose of helping to meet the future needs of the entire
city for park and school sites and drainage facilities, and that they are
not reasonable requirements for the design and improvement of the
subdivision itself.
43 345 P.2d 983 (1959). Rev'd 54 Cal. 2d 86, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493, 351 P.2d 765 (1960).
44 Id.
45 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
46 Id. at 636, 318 P.2d at 564.
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This reasoning has been followed in subsequent decisions. 47 But
in Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles48 the court upheld a fee
of 400 dollars per acre required to be paid into a sewer construction
account. The subdivider urged that Kelber prevented enforcement
of the ordinance. The District Court of Appeal pointed out that the
city of Upland was a general law city and held that the decision was
not applicable to the city of Los Angeles, a charter city. The logic was
stated as follows: 49
Defendant in this case is a charter city with power over municipal
affairs, pursuant to Article XI, section 6, of the Constitution of the
State of California. .. Construction, maintenance, and repair of
sewers and storm drains may be provided by ordinance and sustained
as a valid exercise of police power in the interest of public health
and as an incident to constructing and maintaining streets.... The
Subdivision Map Act does not preclude, but does clearly approve
local ordinances relating to matters covered by the Act .... The
power to make a reasonable charge for the connection to and use of
the sewers was a proper incident to the exercise of police power by
defendant to provide them .... Plaintiffs point out that others had
already paid for or had assumed the burden for paying for much of
this system before the ordinances were passed which are now before
us. This in no way suggests that new subdivisions should not be re-
quired to pay their fair share of the cost of expansion, repair, and
replacement made necessary, in part, by their share in the use of this
vitally essential service5 0
To finance sewers, and as an alternative to imposing a fee as a
condition to approval of the subdivision map, some cities have estab-
lished a fee which must be paid prior to connection to the sewer sys-
tem or as a condition to issuance of a building permit. These fees have
been upheld provided that the receipts are used for sewer purposes. 51
They do give rise to controversy, however. The city of Livermore
adopted two ordinances providing for the payment of sewer connec-
tion charges as a prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit.
The first ordinance provided for a fee of 150 dollars per dwelling unit
and that the fees for other types of buildings were to be subsequently
fixed by ordinance or resolution. The latter was never done. The sec-
ond ordinance, which repealed the first, required the same fee for
dwellings and in addition set a schedule for the fees to be paid by other
47 See, e.g., Wine v. Council of City of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1960).
48 183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1960).
40 Id. at 539, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (1960).
50 Similar, with respect to drainage facilities, is the reasoning and result in City of
Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1960).
51 Cramer v. City of San Diego, 164 Cal. App. 2d 168, 330 P.2d 235 (1958).
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types of buildings. Both ordinances required the fees to be paid into
a special fund, from which monies could be used only for expanding
the sanitary sewer system or for servicing any bonded indebtedness of
the city incurred for sanitary sewer purposes. The trial court held both
ordinances unconstitutional (as revenue measures made under the
guise of police power and that a general law city has no legislative
authority to levy the charges. The court also held the classification
schedule for fees in the second ordinance to be unreasonable and dis-
criminatory. In a very recent decision, the Supreme Court approved
both ordinances as a valid exercise of the police power and as revenue
measures under the authority of Health and Safety Code section 5471.52
In general, this matter of fees is affected by much legislation un-
related to the basic operation of the Subdivision Map Act. In connec-
tion with sewers and drains, the act itself provides that where a local
ordinance requires the installation of such facilities by the subdivider
as a condition to approval of the map, and where the facilities will
serve areas outside the subdivision, the governing body may collect
a charge from those outside the subdivision who use the facilities and
may reimburse the subdivider.58 These sections once referred only to
sanitary sewers but they were amended in 1955 to include drains. The
amendment was held not to be retroactive so as to affect the validity
of a contract made under the former version despite a legislative dec-
laration that the change was merely to clarify existing law.54
In 1959 Business and Professions Code section 11543.5 was added
to provide for imposition of a fee to defray a ratable portion of the
costs of constructing planned drainage facilities. Payment of the fee
may be made a condition of approval of the map, but a number of
conditions specified in the section must be met before such fees may
be imposed. By its terms the section was limited in effectiveness to
the ninety-first day after adjournment of the 1961 session of the legis-
lature. The 1961 Legislature made the provision permanent. 55
Perhaps such items of detailed legislation, dealing with specific
matters, are to be the future solution to the whole range of subdivision
control problems.
52 Associated Homebuilders v. Livermore, 56 Cal. 2d 866, 17 Cal. Rptr. 5, 366 P.2d
448 (1961).
53 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11543, 11544.
54 Lawrence v. City of Concord, 156 Cal. App. 2d 531, 320 P.2d 215 (1958).
55 Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 427, § 1, p. 1490.
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